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Abstract
Thisstudyexaminesthepost-M&Ainnovativeperformanceofacquiringﬁrmsinfourmajorhigh-techsectors.Non-technological
M&As appear to have a negative impact on the acquiring ﬁrm’s post-M&A innovative performance. With respect to technological
M&As, a large relative size of the acquired knowledge base reduces the innovative performance of the acquiring ﬁrm. The absolute
size of the acquired knowledge base only has a positive effect during the ﬁrst couple of years after which the effect turns around and
we see a negative effect on the innovative performance of the acquiring ﬁrm. The relatedness between the acquired and acquiring
ﬁrms’ knowledge bases has a curvilinear impact on the acquiring ﬁrm’s innovative performance. This indicates that companies
should target M&A ‘partners’ that are neither too unrelated nor too similar in terms of their knowledge base.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Contributions based on the resource-based view of
the ﬁrm (Barney, 1986, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984), in
combination with related work that stresses the impor-
tance of organizational learning and innovation (Conner
and Prahalad, 1996; Grant, 1996; Levitt and March,
1988; Nonaka, 1991), provide some useful insights and
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a preliminary explanation why M&As continue to be
a popular growth strategy of many companies (World
Investment Report, 2000). In that context, it is stressed
that opportunities for organizational learning increase
when a ﬁrm is exposed to new and diverse ideas based
on differences in technological capabilities between the
acquiringandtheacquiredﬁrm(seealsoGhoshal,1987;
Hitt et al., 1996). Acquiring diverse external knowledge
bases and making proper use of this new knowledge are
found to be relevant contributions to a ﬁrm’s post-M&A
innovative performance.
Our current study is clearly linked to recent research
that has already made some progress in analyzing criti-
cal success factors that have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on a
ﬁrm’s post-M&A innovative performance. For instance,
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Ahuja and Katila (2001) studied the impact of the abso-
luteandrelativesizeofacquiredknowledgebasesonthe
innovative performance of ﬁrms in the chemicals indus-
try. Our study is an extended replication of the analysis
by Ahuja and Katila (2001). Contrary to the applied sci-
ences, replication studies are not very popular in most of
thesocialsciences,withthepossibleexceptionofapplied
econometrics and some ﬁelds in psychology. Hubbard
and Vetter (1992, 1997) and Fuess (1996) found that
leading journals in economics, management and ﬁnance
publishrelativelyfewextendedreplicationstudies.From
a purely methodological point of view, this comes as
quite surprising because so far the management litera-
turehasgeneratedaslightlyconfusingbodyofliterature,
to say the least. For many basic questions in the litera-
ture,thereaderwillﬁndcontradictoryﬁndings,different
measurements, unclear international implications, and
the use of a range of partly overlapping constructs.
The Ahuja and Katila (2001) study concentrated on
the effect of M&As in a single medium-tech industrial
context: the chemicals sector. Their contribution invites
subsequent research by others to consider a wider range
of industries, in particular high-tech industries. Our
study extends their work by analyzing the post-M&A
innovative performance by means of a large sample of
ﬁrms operating in four high-tech sectors (OECD, 1997):
aerospace and defense, computers and ofﬁce machin-
ery, pharmaceuticals, and electronics and communica-
tions. These high-tech sectors are selected for two main
reasons. First, these industries are primarily knowledge-
drivenindustries(OECD,1997).Technologicallearning
is expected to be a key determinant in creating and sus-
taining a competitive advantage for many of the sample
ﬁrms in these industries (Bierly and Chakrabarti, 1996).
Second, for each of these industries, we can measure
innovative performance through the same indicator, i.e.
patents. It is well known that particularly in these indus-
tries, patents play a signiﬁcant role in indicating impor-
tant aspects of innovative performance (Hagedoorn and
Cloodt, 2003; OECD, 1997). As will be demonstrated
below, our extended replication study is able to conﬁrm
some ﬁndings of the Ahuja and Katila (2001) study but
it also generates some important new insight related to
the speciﬁc role of knowledge depreciation and time-
constrained knowledge transfer through M&As in a
number of high-tech industries.
2. Theory and hypotheses
According to the resource-based theory of the ﬁrm
and the knowledge-based view, differences in innova-
tive performance between ﬁrms are a result of dissimi-
lar knowledge sources (Bierly and Chakrabarti, 1996).
Therefore, it is the ﬁrm’s ability to acquire, transfer
and integrate the acquired ﬁrm’s knowledge base into
the knowledge base of the acquiring ﬁrm that creates a
sustainablecompetitiveadvantage(Barney,1986).How-
ever, we do realize that not all acquisitions are under-
taken for technological reasons with the sole intent to
learn (Hamel, 1991). M&As might also be motivated
by market-entry and market-structure related consider-
ations, or by the desire to expand the ﬁrm’s product
range internationally (Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993;
Chakrabarti et al., 1994; Hagedoorn and Sadowski,
1999; Trautwein, 1990). These considerations motivate
ﬁrms to undertake non-technological acquisitions that
are less likely to provide technological knowledge to the
acquiring ﬁrm.3
IfM&Asinvolvenooronlyafewtechnologicalcom-
ponents, they are expected to have little or no effect
on the innovation routines of the acquiring ﬁrm. How-
ever, if M&As create a disruption of the established
routines,therebyconsumingsigniﬁcantmanagerialtime
and energy, they can have a negative impact on the post-
M&A innovative performance (Ahuja and Katila, 2001;
Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Hitt et al., 1996). In
particular, acquisitions motivated by non-technological
incentives, such as short-term proﬁt growth, can require
so much managerial attention that this leads to a lower
managerial commitment to long-term investments in
innovation (Hitt et al., 1996). In summary, we expect
that non-technological M&As either contribute little to
the innovative output of the acquiring ﬁrm, or that there
might be a negative impact on the post-M&A innovative
performance. Hence,
Hypothesis 1. Non-technological acquisitions will
have either a negative or a non-signiﬁcant effect on the
post-M&Ainnovativeperformanceoftheacquiringﬁrm.
The possible positive impact of technological M&As
on innovative performance depends on a number of fac-
tors. A ﬁrst critical dimension in the technological uni-
ﬁcation of two ﬁrms concerns the size of the acquired
knowledge bases (Ahuja and Katila, 2001). The effect
3 As indicated by one of the referees, we focus in our paper on scale
and scope effects in technological knowledge but ﬁrms are of course
also concerned with scale and scope effects in products and industries.
If we envisage the role of the ﬁrm as transforming technologies into
products, non-technological acquisitions can expand sales and market
shares of products having a positive effect on the economic perfor-
manceoftheacquiringﬁrm.Thesameargumentholdsforundertaking
a very closely related technological acquisition that may raise market
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of M&As depends on whether targets have a similar or
preferablylargerR&Dinputandotherinnovativeactivi-
ties.Theuniﬁcationoftwoknowledgebasescanprovide
opportunities for synergies in future R&D, while reduc-
ing redundant or duplicate R&D efforts and provide a
larger research base to ﬁnance costs (Cassiman et al.,
2005; Hall, 1990).
Another positive effect of the increased size of
knowledge bases, is found in the potential for aggre-
gation (Grant, 1996). The transfer of knowledge from
the acquired ﬁrm to the acquiring ﬁrm involves both
transmission and receipt (Grant, 1996). Receipt can
be analyzed in terms of a ﬁrm’s absorptive capacity,
which plays a dual role in improving innovative per-
formance (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, 1990). When a
ﬁrm increases its internal knowledge base by acquiring
knowledge, it can use this knowledge to generate new
innovations. In addition, the expansion of the internal
knowledge base also increases the ﬁrm’s ability to rec-
ognize the value of new information, to assimilate it and
to exploit it for commercial ends (Cohen and Levinthal,
1989).
Hence,byundertakingM&As,ﬁrmsarenotonlycon-
fronted with the internally created knowledge base of
the acquired ﬁrm. By taking over the acquired ﬁrm’s
knowledge base, the ﬁrm will be able to view some
issues from a different perspective and recognize the
value of new external knowledge, which can help the
acquirer develop a richer knowledge base (Ahuja and
Katila, 2001; Levinthal and March, 1993; Vermeulen
andBarkema,2001).Severalstudiesmentiontheadvan-
tages of creating a richer or broader knowledge base,
such as increased strategic ﬂexibility, sustainable com-
petitive advantage, and increased performance (Bierly
and Chakrabarti, 1996; Henderson and Cockburn, 1994;
Reed and DeFillippi, 1990). We expect that the acquisi-
tionofexternallyavailableknowledgeleadstoincreased
economies of scale and scope and a broader knowledge
base, both having a positive effect on innovative perfor-
mance.
Hypothesis 2. There is a positive relationship between
the absolute size of the acquired knowledge base and
the post-M&A innovative performance of the acquiring
ﬁrm.
The challenge for companies is not just to acquire
knowledge bases but also to integrate them in order to
improve the post-M&A innovative performance (Ahuja
and Katila, 2001; Child et al., 2001; Haspeslagh and
Jemison, 1991). This integration process forms the sec-
ond critical dimension in the uniﬁcation of two ﬁrms.
The integration of a knowledge base that is of a rela-
tivelylargesizecandisruptexistinginnovativeactivities





to be devoted to integration activities, leaving fewer
resources for the actual innovative endeavor (Ahuja and
Katila, 2001). Thus, we expect that with the integration
of a relatively large knowledge base, fewer resources
will be available for innovative activities, which has a
negative impact on the acquirer’s post-M&A innovative
performance.
Hypothesis3. Thereisanegativerelationshipbetween
the relative size of the acquired knowledge base and the
post-M&Ainnovativeperformanceoftheacquiringﬁrm.
A third important factor in the merger of two ﬁrms
is their relatedness in terms of particular ﬁelds of tech-
nology that the acquiring ﬁrm shares with the acquired
ﬁrm (Cassiman et al., 2005; Hagedoorn and Duysters,
2002). While the relatedness of M&As in terms of
product–markets concerns the industry-aspect, the tech-
nological relatedness refers to ﬁrm-speciﬁc aspects such
as technological disciplines and engineering capabili-
ties. The positive effect of relatedness in technological
knowledge on the success of M&As is found by several
studies that emphasize the effects of economies of scale
andscopeofR&D,suchasashorterinnovationlead-time
andthepossibilitytoengageinlargercombinedprojects
(Gerpott, 1995; Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002).
Fromanorganizationallearningperspective,thispos-
itiveeffectliesintheabilitytobetterevaluateandutilize
related externally acquired knowledge than unrelated
externally acquired knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal,
1990). This is based on the idea that a ﬁrm’s absorptive
capacity depends mainly on its level of knowledge in a
speciﬁc ﬁeld (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Duysters and
Hagedoorn, 2000; Mowery et al., 1996). If the knowl-
edge base of the acquirer is not sufﬁciently adapted to
theacquiredknowledge,theabsorptionprocessbecomes
very difﬁcult (Duysters and Hagedoorn, 2000). There-
fore, we argue that unrelated technologies often require
aradicalchangeinthewayoforganizingresearch(Kogut
and Zander, 1992) which can easily be counterproduc-
tive (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Dosi, 1988).
However, technological knowledge and engineering
capabilities that are too similar to the already existing
knowledge of the acquiring company will contribute
little to the post-M&A innovative performance. SomeM. Cloodt et al. / Research Policy 35 (2006) 642–654 645




ﬁrm’s knowledge base and a proper use of the external
knowledge are relevant contributions to a ﬁrm’s innova-
tiveperformance(CohenandLevinthal,1989;Griliches,
1990; Pakes and Griliches, 1984). In other words, we
expect that one has to strive for moderate relatedness
betweenknowledgebases.Ontheonehand,theacquired
knowledge has to show enough overlap to facilitate the
absorption process. On the other hand, the combination
of knowledge bases requires enough diversity to make
a substantial contribution to the post-M&A innovative
performance. Hence,
Hypothesis 4. The technological relatedness of the
acquired knowledge base will be curvilinearly (inverse
U-shaped) related to the post-M&A innovative perfor-
mance of the acquiring ﬁrm.
3. Methods
3.1. Model
This study uses a panel dataset model that combines
timeseriesandcross-sectionstoanalyzeourdataandtest
the hypotheses. Following Ahuja and Katila (2001),w e
specify the following random effects negative binomial
regression model:
Pit = exp(Xit−1γ + Ait−1β1 + Ait−2β2
+Ait−3β3 + Ait−4β4)
where Pit is a non-negative integer-valued count vari-
able for post-M&A innovative performance, measured
by the number of patents achieved by ﬁrm i in year t,
Xit−1 the vector of control variables affecting Pit (e.g.
ﬁrmsize,industry,nationality,culturaldistance,timeand
unobserved heterogeneity), Ait−year j the lagged vector
of the independent variables for year j=1–4, γ the vec-
tor of regression coefﬁcients for the control variables,
and the βs are the vectors of regression coefﬁcients for
the jth period lagged independent variables. By includ-
ing lagged effects we can subsequently test the effect of
acquisitionsforupto4yearsaftertheyeartheM&Awas
originallymade.ThetotalimpactofanM&Aacrosstime
can be analyzed by summing the regression coefﬁcients
on the distributed lags. By calculating t-statistics we can
test the hypothesis that the total impact of acquisitions,
summed across all years, is zero and check whether it is
statistically signiﬁcant (Greene, 1993). The variance for
the summed coefﬁcients can also be computed with this




unobserved heterogeneity as an additional covariate in
the model (Xit−1). However, possible unobserved ﬁrm
effects can lead to serial correlation among the residu-
als of observations from the same ﬁrm. To address this
issue of unobserved heterogeneity we used the general-
ized estimating equations (GEE) estimation procedure
to estimate all models. This procedure provides a direct
approachtomodelinglongitudinalcountdatawithserial
correlation (Liang and Zeger, 1986).
3.2. Sample and data
The hypotheses are tested on a relatively large inter-
national sample of companies covering four high-tech
industries: aerospace and defense (SIC-codes 372 and
376), computers and ofﬁce machinery (SIC-code 357),
pharmaceuticals (SIC-code 283) and electronics and
communications (SIC-code 36). Our sample consists
of 347 companies of which 21 (6.05%) operate in the
aerospace and defense industry, 76 (21.9%) are found
in computers and ofﬁce machinery, 77 (22.19%) are
active in pharmaceuticals, and 173 (49.86%) operate in
the electronics and communications sector. The sample
consists of 256 North American companies and 91 com-
panies from other regions (45 from Europe and 46 from
Asia). Our sample can be classiﬁed as a balanced panel
datasetmeaningthatnoﬁrmsexitedtheindustryorwere
acquired by others during the period of our analysis. In
addition, there were no ﬁrms that entered the sample at a
later period in time. All the ﬁrms included in the sample
have the same starting point.
Our sample is also diverse in terms of the distribution
of the size of companies. About 18% of the companies
in our sample are relatively small with less than 1000
employees. Almost the same percentage of companies
canbecharacterizedasverylargewithmorethan50,000
employees. More than half of the sample (64%) can be
found in intermediate size-classes.
In total, we identiﬁed 2429 M&A events for our
sample ﬁrms in the period 1985–1994. These M&A
events refer to the merging of two more or less equal
companies, as well as to acquisitions where one com-
pany obtains majority ownership over another com-
pany. To distinguish between technological and non-
technological M&As, we analyzed if the target ﬁrm had
any patenting activity in the 5 years preceding the M&A
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M&As,1148mettheabove-mentionedcriterionandthey
are classiﬁed as technological M&As. The remaining
1281 M&As are classiﬁed as non-technological M&As.
Fortheﬁrmsinthesample,weobtainedannualpatent
countdatafortheperiod1980–1994andacquisitionand
ﬁrm-speciﬁc data for the years 1980–1993. The ﬁnal
panelfortheregressionanalysisamountsto7yearsfrom
1989 to 1995.
It is well known that there is no ‘ofﬁcial’ database
with a world-wide, industry level list of all companies
from which one can draw a random sample. Our sample
is taken from the Securities Data databank, which con-
tains information on the year an M&A was established,
the acquirer, the target, the parent acquirer and the par-
ent target ﬁrm. Industry information is provided in SIC
codes of the acquiree and acquirer. Acquiring ﬁrms are
selected based on the industry information provided in
SIC-codes which should cover one of the four high-tech
industries as mentioned above. Additional information




(US Department of Commerce).
3.3. Variables
The dependent variable, post-M&A innovative per-
formance of the acquiring ﬁrm, is measured by the
number of patents granted to each acquiring ﬁrm.4 We
measure patentsit as the number of successful patent
applications or patents granted, for the acquiring ﬁrm
i in year t. The dependent variable is based on the num-
ber of patents of the acquiring ﬁrm obtained during 1–4
years after the M&A.
Number of non-technological M&As. M&As are
reported as technological acquisitions if the acquired
ﬁrmhadanypatentingactivityduringthe5yearspreced-
ing the acquisition. M&As that did not meet the above-
mentionedcriterionareconsideredasnon-technological
M&As. To distinguish non-technological acquisitions
fromtechnologicalacquisitions,weanalyzedthepatent-
ing activity of the acquired ﬁrm in the 5 years preceding
the M&A event.
Absolute size of acquired knowledge base. For each
acquiringﬁrmandforeachyear,alistwasmadewiththe
4 Contrary to Ahuja and Katila (2001), our dependent variable is
measured by patents granted and we do not assign a granted patent
to the year in which it was originally applied for due to right hand
censoring and data limitations.
number of the patents that its acquisitions had obtained
during the preceding 5 years before the particular M&A
event.Thesepatentswerethencombinedwiththepatents
that were cited by these companies. Duplicates were
abstracted from the list to ensure that a patent code
appears only once. The acquired knowledge base was
then calculated as the number of patents (i.e. knowledge
elements) on this list.
Relative size of acquired knowledge base. This vari-
able was measured by dividing the absolute size of
the acquired knowledge base by the absolute size of
the acquiring ﬁrm’s knowledge base. The absolute size
of the acquiring ﬁrm’s knowledge base was calculated
using the same procedure as the absolute size of the
acquired ﬁrm’s knowledge base. In very few cases, the
acquired knowledge base was larger than the acquiring
ﬁrm’sknowledgebase.Inthesecases,weusedthelarger
number as the denominator. As we are interested in the
relativeproportionofthemergedﬁrm’sresourcesthatare
likely to be occupied with integrative rather than inven-
tiveactivity,anumbergreaterthanoneisnotmeaningful.
Technologically related and technologically unre-
lated M&As. To measure the relatedness of the acquired
knowledge base, we composed a list of patent codes that
appearedinboththeacquiredﬁrm’sknowledgebaseand




sist of four lagged versions.
3.4. Control variables
Wecontrolforanumberofpossibleadditionaleffects
on the post-M&A innovative performance of the acquir-
ing ﬁrm. Previous research on the effect of cultural dis-
tance on post-M&A performance suggests both positive
and negative effects, but the negative effects seem to be
dominant (Datta, 1991; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991).
We use the Kogut and Singh (1988) modiﬁed index of
Hofstede to control for international cultural differences
between companies involved in M&As. When calculat-
ing this variable we have to make a correction as a zero
for an observation in a certain year can represent both
a domestic M&A (no cultural distance) and no M&A
(technological or non-technological) in that particular
year. We use a dummy variable to correct for this by set-
ting the values of a dummy variable cultural distance to
one, each year no M&A took place.
Studies by Griliches (1998) and Pakes and Griliches
(1984) indicate a statistical relationship between R&D
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appears to gradually decrease with an increase in R&D
expenditures. The control variable for yearly R&D
expendituresisstandardizedbyconvertingthedatafrom
national currencies to US dollars.
Previous studies indicate that the patent activity of
companies increases with size (Cohen and Levin, 1989;
Mansﬁeld, 1986). The size of the acquiring ﬁrm is mea-
sured by taking the natural log of its number of employ-
ees. We also control for differences between the four
high-tech sectors. All four sectors are high-tech indus-
tries but there is still considerable dissimilarity in their
R&D and patenting-intensity (OECD, 1992), which can
partlybeexplainedbyinter-sectoraldifferencesbetween
the nature of knowledge and the regime of appropri-
ability. We included sector dummies to control for these
differences.Giventheinternationaldifferencesinpatent-
ing behavior between companies from the USA, Europe
and Japan (OECD, 2001), we control for the national-
ityoftheacquiringﬁrm.ANationalScienceFoundation
(1998) study shows that the number of patents increased
signiﬁcantly during the period of our study. To control
for this we included year dummies.
Pre-sample differences in the number of patents of
the sample ﬁrms should have a positive inﬂuence on the
innovative performance of the acquiring ﬁrm after the
M&A. Firms that achieve high levels of innovativeness
have, according to Dosi (1988), also a higher chance of
maintaining or increasing their level of innovativeness.
The ﬁrm heterogeneity control variable pre-sample
patents is measured as the sum of patents obtained by
a ﬁrm in the 3 years prior to the ﬁrm’s entry into the
sample.
As already mentioned in the previous section, the rel-
ative size of the acquired knowledge base is calculated
by dividing the absolute size of the acquired knowledge
base by the size of the acquiring ﬁrm’s knowledge base.
However, in a few cases, the acquiring ﬁrm’s knowl-
edge base is zero for some of the years in the panel data
set. In order to calculate the relative size correctly, we
follow Hausman et al. (1984) and set these speciﬁc val-
ues to one instead of zero and use a dummy variable,
called dummy absolute size acquirers, to correct for this
solution.
4. Results
Appendix A provides the descriptive statistics for all
variables.5 There is little correlation between the main
5 We do not report the extensive correlation statistics, this informa-
tion is available from the authors.
independent variables, with the expected exception of
relatedness of the acquired knowledge base with its
squared term. There is also little correlation between the
independent variables and the control variables. Only
the correlation between pre-sample patents and R&D
is rather high (0.784), although lower than reported by
Ahuja and Katila (0.89). Since we have to control for
unobserved heterogeneity and also because we prefer to
follow the Ahuja and Katila (2001) model, we will keep
both variables in our model.
Table 1 displays the estimation results of the negative
binomialmodelwithdistributedlaganalysisforthepost-
M&A innovative performance of the sample ﬁrms. We
use the full model to discuss our results. The results of
the other models are presented in Appendix B.
Hypothesis 1 argues that non-technological M&As
contribute little to the innovative output of the acquir-
ing ﬁrm or that there might even be a negative impact
on the post-M&A innovative performance. The indi-
vidual coefﬁcients of the variable for the number of
non-technological acquisitions are signiﬁcant and three
out of four show a negative sign. The summed coef-
ﬁcient, reﬂecting the total impact, is negative and
signiﬁcant. Together this provides strong support for
Hypothesis 1.
We also anticipate that the acquisition of the target
ﬁrm’s knowledge base will lead to increased economies
of scale and scope and a broader knowledge base. Both
are expected to have a positive effect on the post-M&A
innovative performance (Hypothesis 2). The individual
coefﬁcients of the variable absolute size of acquired
knowledge base are all signiﬁcant but show a diverse
picture. The absolute size of acquired knowledge base
improves post-M&A innovative performance during the
ﬁrst 2 years, but thereafter it has a negative inﬂu-
ence. The summed coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant and neg-
ative, which also provides no support for Hypothesis
2. Similar to the study of Ahuja and Katila, the total
impact of the absolute size of the acquired knowledge
base on post-M&A innovative performance is rather
small given that a one-unit increase in the absolute size
of the knowledge base leads to a 0.02% decrease in
the post-M&A innovative performance of the acquiring
ﬁrm.
Hypothesis3predictsanegativerelationshipbetween
the relative size of the acquired knowledge base and
the post-M&A innovative performance of the acquir-
ing ﬁrm. The individual and summed coefﬁcients are
all signiﬁcant and negative, which clearly supports this
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4 states that the acquired knowledge base
has to show enough overlap with the acquirer’s already648 M. Cloodt et al. / Research Policy 35 (2006) 642–654
Table 1
Negative binomial regression with distributed lag analysis
Variable Full model
Intercept 3.44 [0.148]***
No. of non-technological acquisitions (t−1) −0.174 [0.012]***
No. of non-technological acquisitions (t−2) −0.081 [0.008]***
No. of non-technological acquisitions (t−3) 0.069 [0.007]***
No. of non-technological acquisitions (t−4) −0.088 [0.012]***
Absolute size of acquired knowledge base (t−1) 0.000025 [0.000002]***
Absolute size of acquired knowledge base (t−2) 0.000028 [0.000003]***
Absolute size of acquired knowledge base (t−3) −0.000228 [0.000008]***
Absolute size of acquired knowledge base (t−4) −0.000032 [0.000005]***
Dummy absolute size acquired knowledge base (t−1) −0.496 [0.149]***
Dummy absolute size acquired knowledge base (t−2) −0.483 [0.145]***
Dummy absolute size acquired knowledge base (t−3) −0.747 [0.161]***
Dummy absolute size acquired knowledge base (t−4) −0.727 [0.169]***
Relative size of acquired knowledge base (t−1) −0.253 [0.027]***
Relative size of acquired knowledge base (t−2) −0.073 [0.039]†
Relative size of acquired knowledge base (t−3) −0.069 [0.028]*
Relative size of acquired knowledge base (t−4) −0.091 [0.031]**
Relatedness of acquired knowledge base (t−1) 0.797 [0.237]***
Relatedness of acquired knowledge base (t−2) 1.069 [0.197]***
Relatedness of acquired knowledge base (t−3) 1.084 [0.364]**
Relatedness of acquired knowledge base (t−4) 0.591 [0.237]*
Relatedness of acquired knowledge base sq (t−1) −0.658 [0.251]**
Relatedness of acquired knowledge base sq (t−2) −0.967 [0.226]***
Relatedness of acquired knowledge base sq (t−3) −0.727 [0.406]†
Relatedness of acquired knowledge base sq (t−4) −0.117 [0.297]
Cultural distance (t−1) 0.106 [0.011]***
Cultural distance (t−2) 0.007 [0.014]
Cultural distance (t−3) 0.022 [0.013]†
Cultural distance (t−4) 0.115 [0.009]***
Dummy cultural distance (t−1) −0.247 [0.031]***
Dummy cultural distance (t−2) −0.119 [0.038]**
Dummy cultural distance (t−3) −0.163 [0.028]***
Dummy cultural distance (t−4) −0.354 [0.027]***
R&D (t−1) −0.001546 [0.000022]***
log employees (t−1) 0.022 [0.013]†
Computers and ofﬁce machinery −0.437 [0.066]***
Pharmaceuticals −0.099 [0.059]†
Electronics and communications −0.378 [0.042]***
European ﬁrms −0.054 [0.052]




No. of non-technological acquisitions −0.273 [0.015]***
Absolute size of acquired knowledge base −0.000208 [0.000009]***
Relative size of acquired knowledge base −0.486 [0.050]***
Relatedness of acquired knowledge base 3.542 [0.474]***
Relatedness of acquired knowledge base sq −2.469 [0.551]***
Cultural distance 0.249 [0.015]***
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existing knowledge base to facilitate the absorption pro-
cess.Yet,therelatednessoftheacquiredknowledgebase
needsenoughdiversitytomakeasubstantialcontribution
to the post-M&A innovative performance. The individ-
ual and summed coefﬁcients for the variable relatedness
of acquired knowledge base are signiﬁcant and positive.
The summed coefﬁcient of the squared term is nega-
tive and signiﬁcant. The individual coefﬁcients for its
squaredtermarenegativeandsigniﬁcant,withtheexcep-
tion of the last lagged period (t−4). Overall, we ﬁnd
support for this hypothesis, indicating that the techno-
logicalrelatednessofM&Ashasacurvilinearimpacton
the post-M&A innovative performance of the acquiring
ﬁrm.
As far as the control variables are concerned, most
of our ﬁndings are quite straightforward. Size of the
companies and pre-sample differences in the knowl-
edge bases of the sample ﬁrms both have a signiﬁcant
positive impact on post-M&A innovative performance.
The region and industry of the acquiring ﬁrm have
a negative inﬂuence on post-M&A innovative perfor-
mance, although the region variable is not signiﬁcant.
The year dummy for 1989 is not signiﬁcant and neg-
ative. In addition, the year dummies for 1990–1994
are all signiﬁcant and negative, relative to the omit-
ted year 1995. This shows that compared with the
previous years, patenting has signiﬁcantly increased
in 1995.
Somewhat surprisingly, cultural distance has a sig-
niﬁcant positive impact on the post-M&A innovative
performance of the acquiring ﬁrm, although the individ-
ual2-yearlaggedvariableisnotsigniﬁcant.Thisﬁnding
supports some less well-known work that indicates that
international M&As can have a positive impact on inno-
vative performance because it might force a company
to rethink its innovation strategy in a more international
context (e.g. Hoecklin, 1995). It turns out that higher
R&Deffortshaveasigniﬁcantnegativeimpactonpatent-
ing output. Additional analysis with a squared term for
this variable, not reported here, does indicate a non-
linear relationship between R&D expenditures and the
dependent variable. This ﬁnding is consistent with pre-
vious research that demonstrates an inverse U-shaped
relationship between R&D expenditures and patenting
(Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002; Scherer, 1984). For
companies with relatively low levels of R&D expendi-
tures, an increase in R&D expenditures will result in an
increase in the number of their patents. However, for
companies that already have a relatively high level of
R&D expenditures, a further increase of these expen-
ditures will not lead to a substantial growth in new
patents.
5. Discussion and conclusions
Our study both replicates and questions some of the
ﬁndingsfromthesinglesectorstudyofAhujaandKatila
(2001), extending into an alternative multi-sectoral
context of high-tech industries such as aerospace and
defense, computers and ofﬁce machinery, pharmaceu-
ticals, and electronics and communications. Similar to
previous work, we made a critical distinction between
the effect of non-technological M&As and technolog-
ical M&As on the post-M&A innovative performance
of the acquiring ﬁrm. Non-technological M&As do
not create additional technological learning or make
any other contribution to the post-M&A innovative
performance. Apparently, they even have a negative
inﬂuence on this performance because they can have a
disruptive effect on a range of activities and established
organizational routines of the integrating ﬁrm (Hitt et
al., 1996). Managing the repair of these disruptions
requires additional resources that otherwise could have
been invested in long-term innovative projects.6
The positive impact of technological M&As depends
on a ﬁrm’s ability to integrate this knowledge and to
alter existing routines in the organization of its research
(Capron and Mitchell, 2000). Our study reveals some
limitations to this potentially positive effect during the
actual uniﬁcation of two ﬁrms. During their integration,
bothﬁrmshavetodealwithadisruptionoftheirexisting
organizational processes and routines (Gerpott, 1995;
HaspeslaghandJemison,1991).Themanagementofthe
companyhastodevotealargeamountofresourcestothe
integration of a relatively large knowledge base, leaving
fewer resources for the innovation process itself (Hitt et
al.,1996).Thisimpliesthatiftheacquiredﬁrm’sknowl-
edge base is relatively large compared to the acquiring
ﬁrm, this can have serious consequences for the integra-
tion of the innovative activities of both M&A partners
with a negative impact on the acquirer’s innovative per-
formance.
As in the chemical industry, the relatedness of the
acquired knowledge base is also an important factor in
the uniﬁcation of knowledge bases in a high-tech set-
ting. It is advantageous to the acquiring ﬁrm to obtain




effect on the general economic performance of the acquiring ﬁrm (see
footnote 3). Our analysis shows that, with all else being equal, the esti-
matednumberofpatentsisrelativelygreaterwhenanon-technological
M&A occurs than when there is no acquisition at all.650 M. Cloodt et al. / Research Policy 35 (2006) 642–654
acquired knowledge base if changes in routines and the
organization of research are incremental (Capron and
Mitchell, 2000; Kogut and Zander, 1992). In addition,
the acquisition of related knowledge provides opportu-
nities for economies of scale and scope (Gerpott, 1995;
Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002; Mowery et al., 1996).
Both advantages leave the acquiring ﬁrm with more
resources for innovative investments.




ing knowledge base is disadvantageous, as the acquir-
ing ﬁrm will have to bear the costs of obtaining and
transferring external knowledge without any relevant
enrichments of its existing knowledge base (Bartlett,
1993). Some degree of differentiation in knowledge
between the acquiring and acquired ﬁrm will enrich the
acquiring ﬁrm’s knowledge base, creating opportuni-
ties for learning and improved innovative performance
(Bartlett, 1993; Kogut and Zander, 1992). This sug-
gests that to increase innovative performance through
M&As, companies have to target ﬁrms with moder-
ately related knowledge bases, avoiding targets with
knowledge bases that are either too unrelated or too
closely related. The above mentioned result is clearly
relatedtoexistingresearchthatanalyzestherelationship
between product–market relatedness and performance,
where several scholars seem to support the inverted-U
shaped model (e.g. Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990; Lubatkin
and Chatterjee, 1994; Markides, 1992; Palich et al.,
2000; Rumelt, 1974, 1982).
In contrast to Ahuja and Katila (2001), our results
clearly demonstrate that in a high-tech setting the acqui-
sition of a large absolute knowledge base only con-
tributes to improved innovative performance during the
ﬁrst couple of post-M&A years. After a few years this
kind of acquisition appears to have a negative inﬂu-
ence. This ﬁnding may seem somewhat surprising and
deserves further attention.
Prior research suggests that knowledge depreciates
and loses its value over time (Glazer and Weiss, 1993;
Henderson and Cockburn, 1994, 1996). In other words,
the knowledge in a given period loses its value in subse-
quent periods. The rate at which the value of knowledge
depreciates is likely to vary across industries but it is
especiallyhighintechnologyintensiveindustries(Wuyts
et al., 2004). According to Glazer and Weiss (1993) in
industries characterized by high turbulence (i.e. high-
tech industries), the value of knowledge tends to depre-
ciate faster because of the high levels of inter-period
uncertainty.
The fact that industries are dissimilar with respect
to their knowledge depreciation rate, explains why the
analysisofAhujaandKatila(2001)showsapositivecon-
tribution of the absolute size of the acquired knowledge
base during a longer post-M&A period. Firms operating
in a medium-tech sector, such as the chemicals industry,
have to deal with less environmental turbulence and a
lower rate of knowledge depreciation than ﬁrms operat-
ing in one of the high-tech sectors. Therefore, ﬁrms in
the chemicals industry can also take a longer post-M&A
timeperiodtoevaluateandidentifytheopportunitiesfor
combining and integrating the acquired knowledge. For
companies in the group of high-tech industries that we
study,evenquiterecentknowledge,datingbackacouple
of years already becomes less valuable, it may even be
worthless and therefore this knowledge plays a positive
role for only a limited period of time after an M&A has
taken place.7
Finally, the current study concentrates on M&As and
theirimpactontheacquirer’spost-M&Ainnovativeper-
formance in several high-tech manufacturing industries.
As this study both replicates and questions some of
the results of the work by Ahuja and Katila (2001),
it could be worthwhile to conduct future research in
other industries. This research could for instance focus
on non-manufacturing industries with alternative mea-
sures of innovation and technological relatedness that
are more appropriate for ﬁrms in service industries.
In addition, future research could extend this study
by examining the long term post-M&A economic per-
formance of the acquiring ﬁrm, thereby considering
the size of the market and the size of the knowl-
edge base in combination. This would enable an even
more comprehensive assessment of the total impact of
M&As.
7 Inaddition,thisphenomenoncanbeexplainedbythelengthoftime
it takes for tacit knowledge transfer to occur in comparison to codiﬁed
knowledge transfer. Immediately after the acquisition it is easier to
transfer codiﬁed knowledge that is transmittable through formal lan-
guage such as patents than to transfer tacit knowledge that consists of
the implicit and non-codiﬁable accumulation of skills and knowledge
(Nonaka,1991;ReedandDeFillippi,1990).However,thegradualcre-
ation of a single organization facilitates the transfer of tacit knowledge
over time (Kogut and Zander, 1992). Firms in the chemical industry
have a relatively high degree of codiﬁed knowledge and a relatively
low degree of tacit knowledge (Cohen et al., 2000). Therefore, ﬁrms in
this industry can also take a longer post-M&A time period to integrate
their crucial codiﬁed knowledge. In high-tech industries tacit knowl-
edge plays a larger role in the innovation process than it does in the
chemical industry (see also Winter, 1987). Hence, in these high-tech
industries the transfer of codiﬁed knowledge can play a role for only
a limited period of time after an M&A has taken place.M. Cloodt et al. / Research Policy 35 (2006) 642–654 651
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Means and standard deviations for all variables
Variable Mean S.D.
(1) Patents 46.490 139.880
(2) No. of non-technological acquisitions (t−1) 0.400 1.030
(3) No. of non-technological acquisitions (t−2) 0.350 0.970
(4) No. of non-technological acquisitions (t−3) 0.320 0.900
(5) No. of non-technological acquisitions (t−4) 0.310 0.880
(6) Absolute size of acquired knowledge base (t−1) 443.200 2303.190
(7) Absolute size of acquired knowledge base (t−2) 371.210 2032.950
(8) Absolute size of acquired knowledge base (t−3) 338.090 1943.130
(9) Absolute size of acquired knowledge base (t−4) 323.580 1887.560
(10) Dummy absolute size acquired knowledge base (t−1) 0.026 0.160
(11) Dummy absolute size acquired knowledge base (t−2) 0.027 0.160
(12) Dummy absolute size acquired knowledge base (t−3) 0.027 0.160
(13) Dummy absolute size acquired knowledge base (t−4) 0.024 0.150
(14) Relative size of acquired knowledge base (t−1) 0.181 0.354
(15) Relative size of acquired knowledge base (t−2) 0.171 0.348
(16) Relative size of acquired knowledge base (t−3) 0.160 0.339
(17) Relative size of acquired knowledge base (t−4) 0.157 0.336
(18) Relatedness of acquired knowledge base (t−1) 0.012 0.084
(19) Relatedness of acquired knowledge base (t−2) 0.013 0.086
(20) Relatedness of acquired knowledge base (t−3) 0.011 0.078
(21) Relatedness of acquired knowledge base (t−4) 0.011 0.078
(22) Relatedness of acquired knowledge base (t−1) sq. 0.007 0.076
(23) Relatedness of acquired knowledge base (t−2) sq. 0.008 0.078
(24) Relatedness of acquired knowledge base (t−3) sq. 0.006 0.070
(25) Relatedness of acquired knowledge base (t−4) sq. 0.006 0.070
(26) Cultural distance (t−1) 0.227 0.687
(27) Cultural distance (t−2) 0.216 0.674
(28) Cultural distance (t−3) 0.209 0.666
(29) Cultural distance (t−4) 0.194 0.648
(30) Dummy cultural distance (t−1) 0.620 0.490
(31) Dummy cultural distance (t−2) 0.650 0.480
(32) Dummy cultural distance (t−3) 0.680 0.470
(33) Dummy cultural distance (t−4) 0.690 0.460
(34) R&D (t−1) 316.159 718.358
(35) log employees (t−1) 8.810 1.962
(36) North America 0.740 0.440
(37) Asia 0.130 0.340
(38) Europe 0.130 0.340
(39) Aerospace and defense 0.061 0.240
(40) Computers and ofﬁce machinery 0.220 0.410
(41) Pharmaceuticals 0.220 0.420
(42) Electronics and communications 0.500 0.500
(43) Presample patents (t−1) 124.210 368.970
(44) Year 1989 0.140 0.350
(45) Year 1990 0.140 0.350
(46) Year 1991 0.140 0.350
(47) Year 1992 0.140 0.350
(48) Year 1993 0.140 0.350
(49) Year 1994 0.140 0.350




Negative binomial regression with distributed lag analysis
Variable 1 2
Intercept −2.992 [0.248]*** 3.467 [0.160]***
No. of non-technological acquisitions (t−1) −0.106 [0.0139]***
No. of non-technological acquisitions (t−2) −0.075 [0.015]***
No. of non-technological acquisitions (t−3) −0.007 [0.011]
No. of non-technological acquisitions (t−4) −0.041 [0.016]*
Absolute size of acquired knowledge base (t−1) −0.000019 [0.000003]***
Absolute size of acquired knowledge base (t−2) 0.000007 [0.000004]†
Absolute size of acquired knowledge base (t−3) −0.000094 [0.000009]***
Absolute size of acquired knowledge base (t−4) −0.000083 [0.000007]***
Dummy absolute size acquired knowledge base (t−1) −0.487 [0.178]**
Dummy absolute size acquired knowledge base (t−2) −0.482 [0.199]*
Dummy absolute size acquired knowledge base (t−3) −0.777 [0.191]***
Dummy absolute size acquired knowledge base (t−4) −0.698 [0.195]***
Relative size of acquired knowledge base (t−1) −0.249 [0.035]***
Relative size of acquired knowledge base (t−2) −0.144 [0.038]***
Relative size of acquired knowledge base (t−3) 0.013 [0.029]
Relative size of acquired knowledge base (t−4) −0.006 [0.036]
Relatedness of acquired knowledge base (t−1) 0.204 [0.099]*
Relatedness of acquired knowledge base (t−2) 0.261 [0.130]*
Relatedness of acquired knowledge base (t−3) 0.506 [0.138]***
Relatedness of acquired knowledge base (t−4) 0.556 [0.104]***
Relatedness of acquired knowledge base sq (t−1)
Relatedness of acquired knowledge base sq (t−2)
Relatedness of acquired knowledge base sq (t−3)
Relatedness of acquired knowledge base sq (t−4)
Cultural distance (t−1) −0.003 [0.028] 0.087 [0.041]***
Cultural distance (t−2) −0.002 [0.035] 0.098 [0.040]***
Cultural distance (t−3) −0.026 [0.029] 0.057 [0.016]***
Cultural distance (t−4) −0.052 [0.027]* 0.046 [0.015]*
Dummy cultural distance (t−1) −0.037 [0.042] −0.295 [0.034]***
Dummy cultural distance (t−2) −0.022 [0.043] −0.193 [0.040]***
Dummy cultural distance (t−3) −0.057 [0.038] −0.243 [0.037]***
Dummy cultural distance (t−4) −0.128 [0.035]*** −0.378 [0.036]***
R&D (t−1) −0.000002 [0.000044] −0.002062 [0.000039]***
log employees (t−1) 0.433 [0.021]*** −0.017 [0.014]
Computers and ofﬁce machinery 0.724 [0.119]*** −0.393 [0.080]***
Pharmaceuticals 1.472 [0.109]*** −0.062 [0.093]
Electronics and communications 0.715 [0.083]*** −0.390 [0.054]***
European ﬁrms −1.693 [0.097]*** −0.056 [0.079]
Presample patents (t−1) 0.063 [0.005]*** 0.347 [0.004]***
N 2429 2429
−2 log-likelihood vis a vis the full model 8113*** 3414***
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